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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3685 
___________ 
 
WALTER BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN PIKE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; SGT. FRAWLEY;  
E. WENZEL, Grievance Coordinator 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-02373) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 21, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 25, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Walter Brown appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s final 
order dismissing with prejudice his complaint.  We will affirm.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Brown filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania alleging that his due process and First Amendment rights were violated 
when Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) Warden Craig A. Lowe, Sargeant 
Frawley, and Grievance Coordinator E. Wenzel improperly opened and withheld his legal 
mail for several months, and withheld his cell phone and cash.  Specifically, Brown 
alleged that upon being transferred back to PCCF from another facility, he was informed 
that a large amount of legal mail was waiting for him from the past few months, and it 
had been opened prior to his receipt.  Brown alleged that he was thus prevented from 
responding to relevant matters in his underlying state criminal proceedings and 
accordingly missed deadlines and had his filings dismissed, denied, or waived.   
 The Magistrate Judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 
recommended that (1) the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, and (2) leave to amend be denied.  Over 
Brown’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations 
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Brown timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  In doing so we accept as true all factual allegations and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.  Id.  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999).  
Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 
107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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 Brown alleged that his due process rights were violated when Defendants withheld 
his legal and personal mail and confiscated his cell phone and cash.  Deprivation of 
inmate property by prison officials – whether intentional or unintentional – does not 
violate the Due Process clause if adequate post-deprivation remedies exist.  Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).  Adequate post-deprivation remedies include prison 
grievance programs and state tort law.  See id.; see also Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. 
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000); Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179-81 
(3d Cir. 1997).   
 Here, a prison grievance program existed, and Brown utilized it.  So an adequate 
post-deprivation remedy existed, and Brown’s due process claim is not cognizable.  See 
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422.  Even if Brown amended his 
complaint to state that the internal prison grievance procedure is constitutionally 
inadequate, Pennsylvania’s state tort law would provide an additional adequate remedy. 
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(a); 8550.  Thus, the District Court was within its discretion 
to deny leave to amend.  See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 121. 
 Brown also alleged that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access 
to the courts.  Brown specifically alleged that Defendants did not timely deliver legal 
mail relating to an underlying state criminal suit, resulting in his motions and a petition in 
that suit being denied or dismissed; he also asserts that he “lost the opportunity to decide 
on any plea agreements.”  Where a prisoner asserts that defendants’ actions have 
inhibited his opportunity to present a past legal claim, he must show (1) that he suffered 
actual injury—i.e., the chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim; and 
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(2) that no remedy may be awarded as recompense for the lost claim other than in the 
present denial-of-access suit.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Appointment of counsel is sufficient to provide prisoners with meaningful access to the 
courts.  Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 Here, Brown was represented by counsel in the underlying state suit during the 
relevant time period, and counsel filed motions and a brief in the matter during this time. 
Thus Brown had meaningful access to the courts.  See Id.  Brown (with the assistance of 
counsel) also pleaded guilty in the underlying state criminal case several months after 
receiving his mail.  Brown never asserted that the withheld legal documents impaired his 
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea several months after their return.  Nor 
does he describe his alleged underlying claims with sufficient specificity to show 
anything beyond a “mere hope.”  See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06.  Thus, he has not 
shown any actual injury.  Nothing in his brief compels a different conclusion, nor does 
anything in his brief show that the District Court abused its discretion in denying leave to 
amend.   
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
